You can’t be rooted unless you’re free and you can’t be free unless you’re rooted L. Ingalls Wilder
Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application
Finding Truth in Science, Justice, and Journalism
Ron de Weijze -
Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.
When modern philosophy developed most articulately in Immanuel Kant's work (Rohlf 2016), post-modern philosophy was an accident waiting to happen, declaring our two sources of life, in dualism, or duality of origin (Bergson 1932), to be one, in monism. At the beginning of the French Revolution (1789), Kant published his great work (1790), in which Anglo-Saxon philosophical "sensibility after-the-fact" independently confirms Continental philosophical "understanding before-the-fact", making it the famous "sensibility before-the-fact" (the "synthetic apriori"). The subject or "phe-noumenon" extended the object or "noumenon", which could establish inter-subjectivity between subjects referring to it. Hegel inverted this, making the object extend the subject. A person or subject should inter-subjectively "re-cognize" another, dependently confirming him for selective reciprocation, while they independently reject another. "The subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself, and loses the world" (Hegel 1807).
In Post-Modernism, deconstruction (Žižek 2012, Derrida 1992) implies that existence is nothingness (Heidegger 1959, Sartre 1943), God is dead (Nietzsche 1882), truth is multiplicit or dialectical (Marx 1867), and reality can only be a mental phenomenon (Hegel 1807), without an independent object. Even though post-modern philosophers praise Kant as their "Copernicus" of the Philosophical Revolution, calling space and time basic categories
in the phe-noumenon, he never forgot about the noumenon or object as they did. One and a half century after the French Revolution (1789-1799), the Cultural Revolution of May 1968 doubled down on the monistic
premise, as Post-Modernism had gone- and come around the world, leaving its brand of social values in collectivism, socialism, and communism. Confronted with missing open- and dynamic dualism, monism diverts to power, politics and dialectics, or groups competing to dominate and submit, until just one
would still stand, on top of a power-distancing pyramid (Mulder 1973).
If our sources, sensibility and understanding, may be called what-is-sensed and knowing, then the subject is the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, while the object is the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The sensed object reflects itself in the sensing subject, as the knowing subject reflects itself in the known object. What-is-sensed reflects itself in sensing, "here", or "there" on the other side, in material space, while knowing reflects itself in what-is-known, "now", or "then" on the other side, in immaterial time. Truth is found, if our sources and their opposite's self-reflections coordinately coincide , and sensing what-is-sensed proves knowing what-is-known to be true, by independent confirmation . Thus, by following states of coordinated coincidence, at stages of independent confirmation, and in phases of social cycles, the independent individual constructively recollects  his world, by social interaction [a], on the one hand constructing social reality [b], while on the other recollecting his social identity [c].
1. Coordinated Coincidence
From the outside, the subject is part of the object, and from the inside, the object is "ob-jected" or "thrown-off" (Sanders and Van Rappard 1982) from the subject. Our sources are the sensed object,
which reflects itself in the sensing subject, and the knowing subject,
which reflects itself in the known object. Sources and their self-reflections are spheres, expanding either inwardly from space/content/behavior at the peripheries in recollection, or outwardly from time/form/consciousness at the depths in construction. Inwardly, space temporalizes, content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, from the periphery to the depth;
outwardly, time spatializes, form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior, from the depth to the periphery. Sensing and what-is-sensed expand in the three spatial dimensions of the periphery, from the
shared tangent point between their spheres, as knowing and what-is-known expand, in
every direction, from the one temporal dimension at the depth or the radius of their spheres.
Today, space and time have nearly become monistically one, in the concept of spatiotemporality. However, in a Euclidean sphere, the three spatial dimensions of its periphery, and the one temporal dimension of its radius, remain dualistically irreducible to each other, because their ratio π ("pi"), is a number carrying infinitely many, non-repetitive, decimal places. As the organism/self/belief interacts with the environment/other/reality, it uses space and time as separate sources. Sensing "here" what-is-sensed at the peripheries of the spheres, dualistically separated from knowing "now" what-is-known at the depths of the spheres, it attempts to co-incide space and time again. From the peripheries of the spheres in recollection, space temporalizes towards the depths, while from the depths of the spheres in construction, time spatializes towards the peripheries. Thus, when recollection and construction co-incide, their spheres become spatiotemporally commensurable, separate from their being material- and immaterial substances.
Our two sources are space and time, or space-time, in the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality. The subject or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief processes space, in sensing what-is-sensed, separately from time, in knowing what-is-known. The sources are separated as spheres, one for space at the periphery, and the other for time at the depth, as they are still connected. Then they are separated
once more, as sources, each with its own self-reflection, where the other source used to be; one source and its co-ordinated self-reflection for recollection or sensing what-is-sensed, and the other for construction or knowing what-is-known. Sources and their opposite's co-ordinated self-reflections are now positioned to potentially co-incide, if they are commensurable. The sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief or subject, together with the sensed- and known environment/other/reality or object, aim to co-incide and to find commensurability, benefiting each of them, to continue staying on track of truth.
Materially sensing what-is-sensed is produced "here" in space/content/behavior, at the spheres' peripheries in recollection, between one source, the sensed object, and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the sensing subject;
immaterially knowing what-is-known is produced "now" in time/form/consciousness, at the spheres' depths in construction, between the other source, the knowing subject and its co-ordinated self-reflection, the known object. The self-reflections go around and come around, co-ordinately reflecting their sources at the three spatial dimensions of their peripheries, subliminally recollecting facts or what-is-sensed, as sensing what-is-sensed is not knowing what-is-sensed (yet), and supraliminally constructing ideas or what-is-known, as knowing what-is-known is not sensing what-is-known (yet). The self-reflections also aim to co-incide with their opposite sources, at the one temporal dimension of their radiuses, for commensurability between the spheres to stay on track of truth. Their three spatial dimensions will follow.
The peripheries of the spheres are material and spatial, while their depths are immaterial and temporal. Thus, "here" is more clear at the peripheries, while "now" is more clear at the depths. The spatiality of the spheres' peripheries enables them to co-ordinate their locations, while the temporality of the spheres' depths enables them to co-incide or synchronize their durations. From the peripheries to the depths of the sensed environment/other/reality and the sensing organism/self/belief, space temporalizes, content-shapes-form and behavior internalizes as consciousness, as from the depths to the peripheries of the knowing organism/self/belief and the known environment/other/reality, time spatializes, form-shapes-content and consciousness externalizes as behavior. The sources have their self-reflections go around them, as they spatiotemporally co-ordinate
their locations at the tangent-line, and co-incide or synchronize, in the subject between sensing and knowing, as well as in the object between what-is-sensed and what-is-known.
The spatial dimensions at the peripheries of the sensed object and the sensing subject in recollection, as well as those at the peripheries of the knowing subject and the known object in construction, co-ordinate "here" or "there". In recollection, space is about to temporalize from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, in one direction, as in construction, time has spatialized from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the other direction. The temporal dimensions at the depths of the sensing subject and the knowing subject, as well as those at the depths of the sensed object and the known object, co-incide or synchronize "now" or "then". In recollection, space has temporalized from the peripheries to the depths of the sphere, in one direction, while in construction, time is about to spatialize from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, in the other direction. Thus, co-incidence allows for space to temporalize and for time to spatialize within the same sphere, if sources and their opposite's self-reflections are commensurable.
In recollection, space/content/behavior occurs causally, between the source and its self-reflection, or what-is-sensed and sensing at the periphery, temporalizing towards the depths-, while in construction, time/form/consciousness is implicated teleologically, at the depths of knowing and what-is-known, spatializing towards the peripheries of the spheres. Reflections go around their spheres, as sensing around what-is-sensed in material recollection, and as what-is-known around knowing in immaterial construction, to coincide with the opposite source, as forms in the sensing- and knowing subject, and as contents in the sensed- and known object. Once sources and opposite self-reflections coincide, their directions "line up", between subject and object, in two opposing
ways. Knowing, from the depth- to the periphery, continues in what-is-sensed, from the periphery to the depth, in one direction,
whereas what-is-known, from the depth- to the periphery, continues in sensing, from the periphery to the depth, in the
One source's self-reflection brings content from the object to the subject,
whereas the other source's self-reflection brings content from the subject to the object. The sensing subject recollects the sensed object, going- and coming around it, to bring content to the knowing subject, as the knowing subject constructs the known object, going- and coming around it, to bring content to the sensed object. Both self-reflections go around their sources, spatially co-ordinated at their peripheries, to temporally co-incide with their opposite sources. In the Euclidean spheres of spatiotemporally co-ordinated space and co-incided time, from the periphery, the spatial dimensions reach for the depth of the sphere, to process what-is-sensed, temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and
behavior internalizing as consciousness, while from the depth, the temporal dimension reaches for the periphery to process what-is-known, spatializing time, form-shaping-content and
consciousness externalizing as behavior,
independently autonomous in dualism.
In recollection, the source or sensed environment/other/reality and its self-reflection, the sensing organism/self/belief, have 'empty' space/content/behavior at the peripheries-, while in construction, the source or knowing organism/self/belief and its self-reflection, the known environment/other/reality, have 'blind' time/form/consciousness at the depths, of their spheres (cf. Kant 1790). To fill the emptiness and heal the blindness, the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief makes its forms coincide, while the sensed- and known environment/other/reality makes its contents coincide, to align spatializing time and temporalizing space, form-shaping-content and content-shaping-form, as well as consciousness externalizing as behavior and behavior internalizing as consciousness, between the depths of the sensing- and knowing subject on one side, and the peripheries of the sensed- and known object on the other side, in opposing directions. The interactions vary from simple sensing and knowing to complex social acting and reacting.
For sources to coincide with the self-reflection of the opposite source, organism and environment, self and other, or belief and reality, have to coordinately reflect themselves first. Their self-reflections must recollect or construct content, going around them, to bring the content to the opposite source for processing, if the spheres are spatiotemporally commensurable. By material recollection, from the peripheries to the depths of the source and its self-reflection, or the sensed object and the sensing subject, coordinately reflected, space/content/behavior temporalizes, shapes form, and internalizes as consciousness, by causal occurrence (Gendlin 1997), "here", or "there" on the opposite side. By immaterial construction, from the depths to the peripheries of the source and its self-reflection, or the knowing subject and the known object, coordinately reflected, time/form/consciousness spatializes, shapes content, and externalizes as behavior, by teleological implication (idem), "now", or "then" on the opposite side, until co-incidence gets through.
Sources reflect themselves "here" at the spheres' peripheries in recollection, or "there" on the opposite source's side, as well as "now" at the spheres' depths in construction, or "then" on the opposite source's side, while the self-reflections go around their sources, seeking to coincide with the opposite source. If they do coincide and they are commensurable, then from the depths to the peripheries of the spheres, time can spatialize, form can shape content and consciousness can externalize as behavior, whereas from the peripheries to the depths of the spheres, space can temporalize, content can shape form and behavior can internalize as consciousness, all in the same sphere. The sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief can now interact with the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, lining-up knowing and what-is-sensed, streaming in one direction, as well as what-is-known and sensing, streaming in the opposite direction. Social interaction can now take place between time/form/consciousness and space/content/behavior.
If space, "here" or "there" at the peripheries-, and time, "now" or "then" at the depths of the subjects' and objects' spheres do coincide, spatializing time, form-shaping-content and consciousness externalizing as behavior, line up with temporalizing space, content-shaping-form and behavior internalizing as consciousness, between subject and object, in both directions. Thus, the objective source reflected in the subject, and the subjective source reflected in the object, can interact "here and now", and what-is-sensed can "here and now" be critical of what-is-known, if they are commensurable in space and time as well, irrespective of their material- or immaterial status. If they are, then what-is-known may be positively verified and therefore proven reliable by what-is-sensed, in order to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended. Sensing can "here and now" be critical of knowing as well, if they are commensurable in space and time, when knowing is negatively falsified, and thus it may be proven valid by sensing.
What-is-sensed are facts and what-is-known are ideas. Ideas relate facts, and facts relate ideas by being reused across ideas, in their meaningful networks. The same facts can be treated as different, or different facts as the same. Meaningful relations are created, in recollection, within-facts-between-ideas, and in construction, within-ideas-between-facts. Relations within-ideas-between-facts do naturally translate into relations within-facts-between-ideas, because independently, they are the same. When facts and ideas are incommensurable in space-time, we experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962), to be reduced by changing the ideas to fit the facts, seeking truth and ethics in open and dynamic dualism, or by changing the facts to fit the ideas, avoiding power and politics in closed and static monism. The latter option destroys the possibility to prove innocence. Continuous dissonance leads to collective socioses (Van den Berg 1956) and/or to personal traumatic stress, if not to tormenting dissociation (Dell and O'Neill 2009).
Facts are synthesized in the 'synthetic aposteriori' or sensibility after-the-fact, and ideas are analyzed in the 'analytic apriori' or understanding before-the-fact (Kant 1781). In recollection, from the periphery to the depth, relations in space/content/behavior, from the past (after-the-fact), through the present, cause the future ones to occur, within-facts-between-ideas. In construction, from the depth to the periphery of the spheres, relations in time/form/consciousness from the future (before the fact), through the present, teleologically imply those in the past, within-ideas-between-facts. Functional structuralism (Dooyeweerd 1935, Sanders 1976) creates contexts in recollection, temporalizing space, shaping form, and internalizing as consciousness. Structural functionalism (Parsons 1975) creates contexts in construction, spatializing time, shaping content, and externalizing as behavior. Truth and ethics, in open and dynamic dualism, forbid ideas to change the facts as opposed to power and politics, in closed and static monism (Bergson 1932).
In temporalized space, "here" relates "now" to any past or -future moment, whereas in spatialized time, "now" relates "here" to any place anywhere else. Thus, relations are functionally structured, by temporalizing space in recollection, within-facts-between-ideas, intrapolated from "there and then" to "here and now", and by spatializing time in construction, within-ideas-between-facts, extrapolated from "here and now" to "there and then". Intrapolation and extrapolation therefore share places and moments in cultural history. Subliminally in sensing what-is-sensed, which cannot be known (yet), as well as supraliminally in knowing what-is-known, which cannot be sensed (yet), we are to realize and intuit these relations. They are the object or the sensed- and known environment/other/reality, to reflect- and coincide with the subject or the sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief, in order to be trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended, as Kant's famous sensibility before-the-fact, he called "synthetic apriori".
2. Independent Confirmation
Opposing Kant, Hegel claimed that the object was insignificant. To him, the thing-in-itself was clear, not opaque, since the object was the subject itself. If facts did not fit ideas, it was “too bad for the facts”. The object for Kant was the noumenon, the unnamable thing-in-itself, which still was able to establish intersubjectivity between subjects referring to it. For Hegel, intersubjectivity meant one person or subject, dependently confirming (or ‘re-cognizing’) another, as they independently rejected a third. By literally ‘re-cognizing’ the other, “the subject goes into the world and loses himself, or [else] he goes into himself and loses the world”. This recognition, if selectively reciprocated by the other, was supposed to be a prerequisite for self-consciousness. Therefore, while for Kant the phenoumenon or subject extended the noumenon or object, for Hegel the object, or intersubjectivity based on recognition, extended the subject, which is the exact reverse and revolutionary indeed, hacking Kant's work just after it was all published (Kant 1790).
Phenomenological monism describes cultural reality as social constructs based on intersubjectivity (Schütz 1945, Berger and Luckman 1966). We may wonder, whether this intersubjectivity leaves room for independent confirmation, for independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in social- and personal settings, because sooner or later, power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, by using different facts as if they were the same or by using the same facts as if they were different. For example, when voters show behavioral contagion (Wheeler 1966), votes should not be counted as independent confirmations. Truth and ethics' intrinsic motivation to seeking independent confirmation may not be confused with power and politics' extrinsic motivation to avoid dependent rejection, dependently confirming friends (cronyism), while independently rejecting enemies (prejudice).
Processing is spatiotemporal coincidence plus independent confirmation, between material- and immaterial substances. If sensing what-is-sensed independently confirms knowing what-is-known, then both forms, or sensing and knowing, could process both contents, or what-is-sensed and what-is-known. Forms are therefore copied and swapped. Knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) and sensing what-is-known (or intuition) then emerge from subconsciousness, as different material- and immaterial substances, using the new forms to process old contents. Forms which are copied and swapped, also generate two separate streams of content, relative to form, between object and subject. Both flow from the depth to the periphery in spatializing time, and from the periphery to the depth in temporalizing space, teleologically as form-shaping-content and causally as content-shaping-form. One stream is knowing what-is-sensed (or realization) in recollection, whereas the other stream is sensing what-is-known (or intuition) in construction.
Intrinsically motivated by truth and ethics, modern dualism separates subject and object. Sensing what-is-sensed or external normativity as temporalized space in recollection, and knowing what-is-known or internal normativity as time about to spatialize in construction, coincide. Independent confirmation should follow, between forms (sensing and knowing) at the depths of their spheres, by negative falsification, and between contents (what-is-sensed and what-is-known) at the peripheries of their spheres, by positive verification. Extrinsically motivated by power and politics, on the contrary, post-modern monism is belief in dependency between subject and object, or denial that there any difference does exist between them (Hegel 1807). In monism, internal normativity is sent from the top of the social hierarchy, while external normativity is received at the bottom thereof. Dependent confirmation for those in higher ranks and independent rejection of those in lower ranks ensue, aspiring for selective reciprocity.
When sensing what-is-sensed is not yet knowing what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known is not yet sensing what-is-known, "here" in what-is-sensed coordinately reflected in sensing, and "now" in knowing coordinately reflected in what-is-known, did not yet coincide for current content. The sensing- and knowing organism/self/belief interacts with its sensed- and known environment/other/reality to accomplish that. Once coincidence is reached, space can temporalize and time can spatialize, enabling independent confirmation between sensing what-is-sensed and knowing what-is-known to happen as well. As forms are copied and swapped, knowing what-is-sensed and sensing what-is-known, or realizing what-is-realized and intuiting what-is-intuited, at the second stage of independent confirmation, emerge from subconsciousness. It depends on the reliability of what-is-known and the validity of knowing, whether the next stages of independent confirmation prove reliable and valid enough as well, for them to be reached.
When the reliability of current contents, and the validity of current forms, are robust enough, coincidence and independent confirmation reoccur at a higher stage, between forms (this time realizing and intuiting instead of sensing and knowing) and between contents (this time what-is-realized and what-is-intuited instead of what-is-sensed and what-is-known), they can emerge as (1) valuing what-is-valued, or intuiting what-is-realized (sensing what-is-known-what-is-sensed, or sensing what-is-known merged with knowing what-is-sensed), and (2) trying what-is-tried, or realizing what-is-intuited (knowing what-is-sensed-what-is-known, or knowing what-is-sensed merged with sensing what-is-known). If reliability and validity then still are robust enough, the same happens between valuing and trying, making them emerge as trying what-is-valued or reacting what-is-reacted and valuing what-is-tried or acting what-is-acted. Thus, in processing form and content, newly copied forms occur, while old forms are implied as new contents.
At the highest stage of processing current content, trying what-is-valued, or reacting, and valuing what-is-tried, or acting, emerge as social interaction. Object and subject become other and self. The self has built trust, expectation, presumption, prediction, belief, and intention, regarding current content, exchanged in social interaction. This consciousness or internal normativity, is not externalized as behavior, until one's reaction in response to the other's action, or external normativity, independently confirms it, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, internalizing it as consciousness. Once it is "set free", it is one's action before-the-fact in response to one's (own) reaction after-the-fact (which is the other's action). Thus a social cycle appears, in which one reacts in response to the other's action, and acts in response to his own reaction, followed by the other reacting in response to the one's action, and acting in response to his own reaction. These are the four phases in social interaction between object and subject or other and self.
Recollection has an interest in the sensing subject and the sensed object, while construction has an interest in the knowing subject and the known object. Thus, constructive recollection takes place in the sensing- and knowing subject between forms, and separately, in the object between the sensed- and known contents. Sources' self-reflections seek coincidence with their opposite sources, and swap copied forms when recollection independently confirms construction by negative falsification and positive verification. As forms are copied and swapped, recollection and construction let new forms process old contents and old forms, which were copied, turning them into substances at a higher stage of independent confirmation. At the highest stage, recollection and construction are part of social reality, as subject and object socially interact, noticeable to each other, both externalizing as behavior and internalizing as consciousness, between time/form/consciousness at the depth-, and space/content/behavior at the periphery of the sphere.
In recollection, the object reflects itself in the subject, as in construction, the subject reflects itself in the object. Once object and subject have become other and self, in social interaction, at the final level of independent rational-, emotional- and/or compassionate confirmation, the other reflects him- or herself in the one, and the one reflects her- or himself in the other. Independent individuals thus can still relate to each other, without the other's actual presence. In post-modern monism, this is different. Instead of bringing people together into their society through seeking independent confirmation, it is through avoiding dependent rejection. To survive, people need strength, either from independent confirmation for- or from each other, or from the power-distancing social hierarchies created by dependent confirmation or 're-cognition' of the other and independent rejection of third parties. The other needs to selectively reciprocate the 're-cognition', supposedly required to achieve self-consciousness (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867).
3. Constructive Recollection
After religion and philosophy, physical science now too appears to harbor dualism, as spatiotemporality can be ontologically material or epistemologically immaterial. Material space can temporalize and immaterial time can spatialize, in the four dimensions of a Euclidean sphere, although the three spatial dimensions of the periphery cannot be reduced to the one temporal dimension of the radius. Empirical sensibility after-the-fact, or recollection, must independently confirm rational understanding before-the-fact, or construction, for sensibility before-the-fact, the "synthetic apriori". Essential to research methodology, as in science, justice and journalism, it is what we trust, expect, presume, predict, believe and intend. By coordinated reflection , sources seek independent confirmation , to stay on track of truth, in constructive recollection . Power and politics, in need of post-modern, closed and static monism, should not dominate and submit truth and ethics, in need of modern, open and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932).
3a. Social Interaction
Groups are formed and society is ordered, either by modern dualism or by post-modern monism. Normativity may be sent and -received in social interaction, as both acting- and reacting individuals are looking for independent confirmation for- and from each other, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups, by offering freedom of choice, like money or attention, if they believe the other has earned it and for which he should be paid (forwardly). If independent confirmation happens, one individual's independence confirms and strengthens the other's independence, as well as his own. It is the final stage of independent confirmation for the current content, "reacting what-is-acted" and "acting what-is-reacted", as new content is arriving. Normative rationality (Habermas 1982, 1991) is minimized to personal preference only, not interfering with social interaction per se, and unable to group-polarize or extremize the private minds of independent, socially interacting, individuals (Moscovici 1969, Meertens 2006).
Content is brought from one source to the other, by the source's self-reflection, going around its periphery, to recollect facts or construct ideas, shaping- or being shaped by form. What is trusted, expected, presumed, predicted, believed and intended in action before-the-fact, is set free in action after-the-fact, when the subject's reaction, in response to the object's action, independently confirms his action before-the-fact, rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. In social interaction, the self senses/realizes/values/reacts what the other knows/intuits/tries/acts, whereas the other senses/realizes/values/reacts what the self knows/intuits/tries/acts, as the one's state which complements the other's. Recollected content expands in four stages, to knowing what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the self) what-is-known (by the self), while separately, constructed content expands in four stages, to sensing (by the self) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the self).
While content is continuously renewing, as moments pass and places change, even if only an eye rolls, content must first shape-, or be shaped by, form. In recollection, content-shapes-form within-facts-between-ideas, as relations occur causally, while in construction, form-shapes-content within-ideas-between-facts, as relations are implied teleologically. Alternating facts, or what-is-sensed, and ideas, or what-is-known, process content. Thus, facts relate ideas while ideas relate facts, until consciousness externalizes as behavior on one side-, and behavior internalizes as consciousness on the other side of social interaction, changing facts and ideas. Independent confirmation takes place every time forms are copied and swapped, extending current recollection and construction, one to four times per phase, which are responses from subject and object to the other and to themselves, to dissolve as reacting what-is-acted, in response to the other, and acting what-is-reacted, in response to themselves, allowing for new facts and ideas to emerge.
States of coordinated reflection and stages of independent confirmation add up to phases of constructive recollection. States alternate between material recollection and immaterial construction, for object and subject or environment/other/reality and organism/self/belief in social interaction, possibly coinciding as recollection or sensing what-is-sensed, "here" or "there" in material space, and construction or knowing what-is-known, "now" or "then" in immaterial time. They can be one of four kinds, different for recollection and construction, depending on the stage of independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, following coincidence, reached for the current content. Up to four states and four stages per phase, constitute one social cycle. Subject and object, or self and other, follow the other's recollection and construction, and their own, as phases continuously repeat themselves and overlap each other. Recollection after-the-fact must independently confirm construction before-the-fact enough to keep interacting.
States-, stages- and phases unite across two social cycles, or eight states of alternatingly material- and immaterial substance, differentiated by forms, which are being copied and swapped. Four stages of independent confirmation are possibly reached, for each state, from sensing or knowing, to realizing or intuiting, valuing or trying, and reacting or acting. Two cycles of four phases follow each other in social interaction, each from one to four states in duration, depending on the number of stages reached. Phases repeat themselves and overlap each other, as they begin one state apart, from the subject responding to the object and itself, to the object responding to the subject and itself, using the same states in different roles, constituting different phases, and taking contents from previous phases, processing- and passing them to following phases, across states. The first cycle of four states applies to the subject, also taking the object’s point of view, whereas the second cycle of four states applies to the object, also taking the subject’s point of view.
All states, at all stages, play four different roles in the phases of the social cycle between other and self, since the four phases overlap, across one to three states. For example, the subject needs four states for its reaction in response to the action of the object, or knowing (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one) what-is-sensed (by the one), also called acting what-is-acted. It started with knowing, and extended with three new forms, one by one, reducing the old forms to new contents. The latter two states are from the object's point of view, while the former two are from the subject's point of view. The latter three are shared with the next phase, the subject's action in response to his own reaction, to which one state was added, the copied and swapped form of reacting, which is now part of sensing (by the one) what-is-known (by the other) what-is-sensed (by the other) what-is-known (by the one), also called acting what-is-acted. Phases add one new state to the beginning and delete one old state from the end.
3b. Social Reality
Recognition can be about power, by dependently confirming the other, or "going into the world and losing oneself", while independently rejecting who "goes into himself and loses the world" (Hegel 1807). Recognition can also be about strength, independently confirming other and self. The former creates a power-distanced hierarchy, for whom checks-and-balances between the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers are necessary (Montesquieu 1749). The latter is Kant's social- and moral order, “based on an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow, despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary” (Kant 1785, Johnson & Cureton 2016). The Categorical Imperative tells the autonomous individual to “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. The "synthetic apriori" or "sensibility before-the-fact" is "understanding before-the-fact", independently confirmed by "sensibility after-the-fact".
Power and politics change facts (what-is-sensed) to fit the ideas (what-is-known), while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Ideas relate facts and facts relate ideas. If facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, it depends on the ideas’ respect for the facts, not to have relations within them entangled. Identically, people relate groups and groups relate people. If people belong to one group, as well as to another, it depends on the groups’ respect for the people, not to have relations within them entangled. Power and politics motivate extrinsically, to avoid dependent rejection, like excommunication or homelessness, within-groups-between-people, and within-ideas-between-facts. Truth and ethics motivate intrinsically, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation, within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups. Power and politics, in need of closed- and static monism, replaced truth and ethics, in need of open- and dynamic dualism (Bergson 1932), which entangled the relations.
People either seek power and politics, or truth and ethics. The former led to people's dependency, or their interdependency. Avoiding dependent rejection, fearing excommunication or homelessness, 'enemies' are independently rejected and 'friends' dependently confirmed, which hopefully results in selective reciprocity and access to the fortunate few. As far as the latter are concerned, truth and ethics can only be found by looking for reality, independently confirming our beliefs - rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately. When object and subject become other and self, this strengthens them as independent individuals. However, independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Power and politics change facts to fit the ideas, while truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts. Entangled relations within-ideas-between-facts show up within-facts-between-ideas, as stress and dissociation.
Our world is divided and mixed. The largest part was created by post-modern, immanently dialectic monism or power and politics, while the rest was created by modern, independent individual dualism or truth and ethics. Monism may look like dualism, as it is dialectic, however it assumes that we are all interdependent and that subgroups or individuals will compete for their own dominance and the other's submission (Hegel 1807, Marx 1867, Nietzsche 1901). Interdependency leads to recognition by dependent confirmation of the other, and independent rejection of third parties, bypassing truth, to provoke polarization, extremism and terrorism. Dualism, on the contrary, assumes that there are two sources instead of one, which interact between any two individuals, other and self, or object and subject, in social belief and social reality, to stay on track of truth. Interdependency based on independent, autonomous individuals seeks independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation for- and from each other, instead.
Both honesty by independent rejection, and loyalty by dependent confirmation, help people avoid dependent rejection such as excommunication and homelessness, within-groups-between-people. Values and norms, within-people-between-groups, are personal and cannot be used to categorize other people's behaviors as honest or loyal. Disloyalty may be interpreted as honesty, and dishonesty may be interpreted as loyalty. Therefore, manipulating another person is always easily possible, by choosing the opposite interpretation. The difference between Hegel's literally re-cognizing the other's cognition (1807), or dependent confirmation of 'friends' and independent rejection of 'enemies', out of loyalty, and Kant's independently confirming the other rationally, emotionally, and/or compassionately, out of honesty, may hardly be noticeable and easily be mistaken. We cannot know what we don't know, unless the group first takes away our individual independence, as in revolutions, telling what we don't know yet were supposed to.
If post-modern monism and modern dualism run into each other, role-sending and role-receiving (Boekestijn 1978) by the former may either grow more intense, or it may be weakened by the latter. The one's internal normativity is the other's external normativity. The sender's external- and the receiver's internal normativity are ignored by monism, which is around since Hegel hacked Kant during the French Revolution and, doubling down, since the Cultural Revolution of May 1968. At crucial episodes in history, group-polarization was able to extremize monism into absolute dictatorship. This has stimulated the will to power (Nietzsche 1901) and action-ability through politics, media and marketing. Power and politics can simply bulldoze their way forward and let facts it created "prove" the ideas. This is what Hegel meant by "too bad for the facts". Thus, power and politics can disguise as truth and ethics. Power changes facts to fit the ideas, making innocence defenseless, whereas truth instead changes ideas to fit the facts.
3c. Social Identity
The kind of social order that is recollected or constructed, determines how social identity develops. If social order is created by power and politics, motivating to avoid dependent rejection, dependent confirmation of the other, hoping for selective reciprocity, and independent rejection of any competition, is what makes up one's mind. This is co-dependency or inter-dependency. If, on the contrary, social order is created by truth and ethics, motivating to seek independent confirmation, independent confirmation is sought to strengthen other and self. Recognition of the other (or self) could be avoiding dependent rejection (reciprocally) or seeking independent confirmation. The object is absent in the former case, while in the latter, it is controlled by classic- and operant conditioning (Pavlov 1910, Skinner 1930). Our reflexes are conditioned responses to conditioning stimuli controlled by nature or culture. They ought not to be conditioned by power and politics demanding re-cognition and consequential selective reciprocity.
As the material source of the object reflects itself in the subject, and the immaterial source of the subject reflects itself in the object, both in need of independent confirmation either by negative falsification for the validity of the immaterial subject and by positive verification for the reliability of the immaterial object, in social interaction, object and subject or other and self may become Significant Other and Self. As parents united in looking after their children, the one's role is looking after material substance in recollection while the other's is looking after immaterial substance in construction, making sure that knowing by the one is valid, and what-is-sensed by the other is reliable. Knowing by the one is what-is-known by the Significant Other of the other and in the other, as what-is-sensed by the other is sensing by the Significant Other of the one and in the one. The more significant the other has become, the less independent confirmation needs to be rational and the more it can be emotional or compassionate in their interaction.
It is between modern philosophical dualism or truth and ethics, and post-modern philosophical monism or power and politics, where and when Self and Significant Other are most critical for the kind of social order, commensurable with it. A partnership or relationship grows tense, when there is competition which is valued at-, or above, the comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Are Self and Significant Other avoiding each other's dependent rejection by dependently confirming each other and independently rejecting third parties, or instead seeking each other's independent confirmation? The former relies on the power and politics of relations within-groups-between-people as in large families or (sub-)cultures, protecting each other against the outside word, while the latter relies on the truth and ethics of relations within-facts-between-ideas not getting entangled, when facts are used in one idea, and reused in another, to establish objectivity or intersubjectivity between subjects independently referring to them.
Ideas relate facts in recollection, as knowing what-is-sensed, intuiting what-is-realized or trying what-is-valued, while facts relate ideas in construction, as sensing what-is-known, realizing what-is-intuited or valuing what-is-tried. Relations create meaningful networks, defining the situation. Relations within-facts-between-ideas are the relations within-ideas-between-facts, where facts have been used in one idea and reused in another. Normally, this widens the network of meaningful relations, as facts or objects establish inter-subjectivity or independent confirmation between subjects referring to them. However, the motivation to avoid dependent rejection within-groups-between-people and within-ideas-between-facts may grow stronger than the motivation to seek independent confirmation within-facts-between-ideas and within-groups-between-people. When power and politics, in need of closed and static monism, take over from truth and ethics, in need of open and dynamic dualism, facts are changed to fit the ideas.
Modern philosophical, open- and dynamic dualism can prevent post-modern philosophical, closed- and static monism, from using polarized power and politics for group-polarization and -extremization, because minority influence has turned out to be strong, when consistent over long periods of time and not dividing the majority’s attention (Moscovici 1974). Relations entangle within-facts-between-ideas and within-people-between-groups, when different facts are used as if they were the same, simulating independent confirmation, or the same facts as if they were different, refuting independent confirmation. In a closed and static approach, Bergson has been accused of criticizing Kant, asking how ideas could categorically demand their own realization through the Categorical Imperative (Lawlor and Moulard 2016). With "re-establish[ing] the duality, the difficulties vanish", Bergson (1932) referred to independent confirmation, between what his post-modern biographers disqualified as "but two complementary manifestations of life".
Notions of compassion, emotion and/or rationality are facts we recollect. Apart from healing illnesses caused by entangled relations, within-people-between-groups and within-facts-between-ideas, to seek independent rational-, emotional-, and/or compassionate confirmation can also help us reach our full potential. Meaningful networks of logical-, chronological-, and/or associative relations within-ideas-between-facts, reusing the same facts as their linking-pins, may broaden and deepen their context. Multiple perspectives in immaterial construction support object-orientation in material recollection. The networks, by linking-pin facts, merge into larger contexts, visualize relations that went unnoticed and may even change neural pathways. This will only happen if power and politics respect the facts and do not overstep their bounds, changing facts to fit the ideas, causing the entanglements, isolating facts from their meaning and people from their identity, thus stoking up traumatic stress and tormenting dissociation1.
Finding truth is an art we learned and willingly unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for the facts, which independently confirm our ideas. Independence needs dualism, which is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, as invariably, power and politics or dialectics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. Truth and ethics change ideas to fit the facts, while power and politics change facts to fit the ideas. Thus, post-modern philosophical monism took over modern philosophical dualism.
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